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Abstract (150 words) 
Procurement strategies that enable early contractor involvement (ECI) in design may 
enhance off-site manufacturing (OSM) by overcoming previously identified barriers to its 
uptake. Involving constructors during the design stage can reduce the risk of design 
buildability issues and standardizing traditionally bespoke ECI processes may help 
overcome cultural resistance to unfamiliar OSM technology. Following literature review 
and using case studies, document analysis, and legal doctrine, a two-stage ECI 
conceptual process model for New Zealand was proposed. This was tested and refined 
following feedback at a conference. The model comprises a first-stage pre-construction 
contract and a second-stage standard form construction contract. Key process variables 
are considered with solutions to provide collaboration and transparency while maintaining 
competitive fixed pricing across the supply chain. Legal doctrine analysis is used to 
distinguish between design buildability obligations and design codes compliance. The 
model contributes towards the development of standard form pre-construction contracts. 
Keywords chosen from ICE Publishing list 
Contracting, Procurement, Project Management  
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1. Introduction 1 
 2 
1.1 Early-contractor involvement (ECI) 3 
Integrating design and production has been a principle of lean design and construction inspired 4 
from Toyota Production System, which focuses on eliminating non-value adding activities and 5 
waste through the whole production system in the supply chain. Jorgensen and Emmitt (2007)‘s 6 
ethnographic case studies identified crucial factors influencing effective lean integration. They 7 
include; identifying client values, project team and planning process, transparent decision-8 
making, management and leadership, continuous learning, and establishing an appropriate 9 
project delivery framework. In particular, appropriate delivery framework is fundamental as it 10 
affects other factors with the incentives, resources (including time, financial means, and human 11 
and organizational resources), contracts, and others in order to integrate design and 12 
construction as an overall lean approach. Similarly this aligns with definitions of construction 13 
procurement decisions being the process of acquiring the resources required to realise a 14 
construction project (see the Australia and New Zealand Government Procurement Agreement 15 
2013;). In addition, Toolanen (2008) included the choice of an appropriate governance structure, 16 
allocation of contractual obligations, and form of compensation. 17 
 18 
Kirkham suggests in the Civil Engineering Procedure 7th edition (Kirkham, 2016) suggest that 19 
early-contractor involvement (ECI) denotes “… a non-traditional procurement route, where a 20 
contractor’s skills are introduced early into a project to bring design ‘buildability’ and cost 21 
efficiencies to the pre-construction phase”.  The term ECI may be used as a concept to describe 22 
any procurement strategy that involves the contractor during the design phase, such as design 23 
and build, management contracting, or construction management, or as its own procurement 24 
system, typically referred to as two-stage procurement process, such as the ‘conditional’ pre-25 
construction contract promoted by Mosey (2011). This may be contrasted with the traditional 26 
single-stage tender model where contractors are invited to bid after designs are fully developed. 27 
 28 
1.2 Construction and OSM in New Zealand 29 
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The New Zealand (NZ) construction industry generates over $30 billion per annum (MBIE, 30 
2013). It contributed over 6.3% of the GDP in 2010 growing from 5% in 2008. Being a significant 31 
industry in NZ, even a one percent saving in process efficiency could equate to a saving of up to 32 
$300 million per year, potentially without affecting the quality or delivery of the built 33 
asset. Despite this growth, there are considerable labour shortage, poor productivity issues and 34 
lack of effective project delivery. Similar to these issues in NZ, researchers elsewhere have 35 
emphasized the importance of the project delivery: Thomas, Luu and Chen (2002, p79) describe 36 
the selection and use of an appropriate procurement system as ‘crucial to project success.’ 37 
 38 
The effectiveness of procurement strategies have been linked to productivity (Wilkinson and 39 
Scofield, 2010; The Building and Construction Productivity Partnership, 2012), innovation 40 
(Loosemore, 2014; de Valence, 2010), and the potential for conflict and disputes (Heaphy, 41 
2011; Jelodar, Yiu and Wilkinson, 2015; Mosey, 2011). Internationally there are growing trends 42 
towards more use of off-site manufacturing to resolve many of these issues including labour 43 
shortage and productivity. The NZ construction industry is no exception (PrefabNZ, 2015) 44 
 45 
Off-site manufacturing (OSM) is a form of modern method of construction (MMC) in which a key 46 
principle is to transfer work off-site. Forms of OSM include; modules or volumetric pods, 47 
panelised, hybrid, and sub-assemblies and components (Wilkinson and Scofield, 2010). 48 
Some of the benefits have been described by Wilkinson and Scofield (2010) including; reduced 49 
on-site congestion, shortened project durations, reduced time-related costs allowing for earlier 50 
building close-in, reduced labour costs, and improved quality through producing work in more 51 
controlled environments. However, there are numerous challenges associated with OSM. The 52 
design must be finalised earlier, making changes during the construction phase more difficult. In 53 
addition, tolerances can be difficult to maintain resulting in connectivity issues; transported units 54 
are subject to size and weight restrictions; units require protection during delivery and storage; 55 
and an increased reliance is placed on manufacturers to deliver when promised. Tradespeople 56 
who are passionate about their craft may be reluctant to adopt OSM processes. 57 
 58 
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Despite drivers toward the MMC concept, its uptake is not without challenges. Shahzad (2011) 59 
categorises the main barriers to the adoption of OSM in New Zealand into seven broad 60 
categories (in descending order of impact and relative contributions): industry and market 61 
culture (16.2%), skills and knowledge (15.5%), logistics and site operations (14.8%), 62 
cost/value/productivity (14%), supply chain and procurement (13.7%), process and programme 63 
(13.6%), and regulatory issues (12.2%). Under the category of industry and market culture, a 64 
conservative market approach and client mind set was found to be prominent constraints. 65 
Limited expertise of designers to handle OSM designs and a lack of experienced manufacturers 66 
were constraints under skills and knowledge. A lack of research and development into OSM 67 
was also noted. Design-related issues were the most prominent constraints under the process 68 
and programme. The main issue is that OSM design choices must be made during design 69 
development resulting in limited freedom to make design changes after the construction phase 70 
commences. Another issue relates to connectivity problems onsite and the potential “mismatch 71 
between design and the manufacturing process” (Shahzad, 2011, p47). Issues associated with 72 
transporting large modular or pre-fabricated units and site restrictions affecting space required 73 
for craneage and manoeuvrability of heavy plant and equipment were the most significant 74 
constraints under logistics and site operations. This correlates with the main constraints under 75 
the cost/value/productivity category, which include concerns about increased project costs for 76 
transportation of OSM units, particularly modular or large units, and for the increased use of 77 
craneage.  78 
 79 
Most of the constraints including difficulties for designers to incorporate OSM technology, 80 
connectivity and potential mismatch between design and manufacturing, and issues with 81 
transportation and site restrictions may be summarized as design buildability issues. Some of 82 
these may also contribute to the first constraint – conservative market culture - particularly given 83 
the need to finalise design decisions earlier and the consequent difficulty to make changes 84 
during construction. Because OSM integrates design and manufacturing, it is critical to involve 85 
key constructors in the design process. Indeed, the integration of construction knowledge to 86 
maximise project performance is at the heart of definitions of ‘constructability’ (see CII, 1998; 87 
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CIIA, 1992) which, according to Jergeas (2009), is used interchangeably with the term 88 
‘buildability.’  89 
 90 
Under single-stage procurement, clients risk commissioning a design which, when tendered, is 91 
found to be unnecessarily difficult or even impossible to build. Involving the constructor in 92 
design development may reduce this risk.  A standard model may help overcome the most 93 
prominent barrier to OSM adoption, industry and market culture (16.2%), being a conservative 94 
market approach and client mind set, because standard forms of contract provide familiarity and 95 
can be tired and tested over time (Ashworth, 2012).  96 
 97 
Through ECI, the works can be collaboratively planned, harnessing the contractor’s buildability 98 
knowledge to foresee risks and maximise value (Laryea and Watermeyer, 2016; Pheng, Gao 99 
and Lin, 2015; Mosey, 2011; Rahmani, Khalfan and Maqsood, 2014; Whitehead, 2009; Song, et 100 
al., 2006). Specific information contributed by the contractor can include aspects such as 101 
resource availability and limitations in terms of cost, performance, access, and site conditions 102 
(Song, et al., 2009, p13). Benefits of such collaboration include; reducing disputes (Mosey, 103 
2011), more transparent pricing (Mosey, 2011; Whitehead, 2009; Berends, 2006), reduced 104 
design changes, avoiding delays, and achieving pre-fabrication-to-erection schedules (Song, 105 
Mohamed and AbouRizk, 2009; Whitehead, 2009).  106 
 107 
Despite all this, the ECI approaches lack clear definition. Debate exists around the extent that 108 
ECI should be considered as purely a partnership concept. In the UK, ECI is typically 109 
considered a form of partnering (Rahman and Alhassan 2012). Some propose that only a 110 
charter is required, however, Mosey (2011) argues that strategies should recognize the 111 
commercial interests of the contracting parties. Rahmani, Khalfan and Maqsood (2013, p2) 112 
describe a two-stage model where contractors are selected on a purely non-price basis to assist 113 
with project planning and develop an ‘open book’ target cost. In contrast, Pheng, Gao and Lin 114 
(2015) describe a two-stage approach that allows contractors’ participation in the design 115 
process while maintaining competitive pricing. Contractors can be invited to tender a price 116 
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based on a notional bill of quantities, then once the design is finalised, a firm bill of quantities is 117 
developed by applying the rates from the original tender.  118 
 119 
There is currently no standard model for two-stage ECI in New Zealand. ECI contracts have 120 
generally remained confined to large infrastructure projects in countries such as Australia, New 121 
Zealand, UK, the Netherlands, and the United States (Rahmani, Khalfan and Maqsood, 2013).  122 
In Australia, Whitehead (2009) describes hybrid models where the first-stage is a form of 123 
partnering and the second stage is often a design and build contract. Examples of those that 124 
have adopted this approach include; South Australia’s Department for Transport Energy and 125 
Infrastructure (DTEI) and Queensland’s Department of Transport and Main Roads (TMR).  126 
 127 
The Joint Contracts Tribunal (JCT) publishes the MC Management Building Contract 2011 128 
within its suite of contracts. However, this is a single contract, which covers both pre-129 
construction and construction stages, rather than a two-stage process. It has also been 130 
criticized for its risk allocation approach and is reportedly the least use contract in the JCT suite 131 
of contracts (see Glover, 2013). The New Engineering Contract (NEC) suite also includes a 132 
management contract option: NEC3: Engineering and Construction Contract Option F: 133 
management contract. Unlike more traditional lump sum construction contracts, NEC (2014a) 134 
describes it as a “cost reimbursable management contract where the financial risk is taken 135 
largely by the client.” In January 2016, NEC released a supplementary additional ECI clause for 136 
use with NEC contracts options C (target contract with activity schedule) and E cost 137 
reimbursable contract) (NEC, 2014b).  The ECI clause provides basic pre-construction 138 
provisions. However, under the NEC FAQs webpage, (NEC, 2014c) clarify that the ECI clause 139 
is not suitable for use with lump sum contracts. The JCT Suite was updated in 2016 and NEC4 140 
was released in 2017. However, the contractual amendments do not fundamentally effect the 141 
approaches to the JCT MC and CM contracts or the NEC ECI clause. 142 
 143 
In 2011, the JCT launched, as part of its suite, the Pre-Construction Services Agreement 144 
(General Contractor) (PCSA) and Pre-Construction Services Agreement (Specialist) 145 
(PCSA/SP). Like bespoke use in New Zealand, these act as a supplement to a standard form of 146 
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construction contract - in this case, the JCT standard contracts for building works only or for 147 
design and build. The latest version of JCT’s Pre-Construction Services Agreement (General 148 
Contractor) PCSA 2016 is described by the JCT as being designed for appointing a contractor 149 
to carry out pre-construction services under a two-stage tender process. The PCSA is claimed 150 
to enable the contractor to ‘collaborate with the employer or their team of consultants to develop 151 
detailed designs, to develop the main contract works, or to compile specialist tender 152 
documents’. It also claims that the early contractor involvement enables the contractor to make 153 
preparation for the construction phase, such as the programme, cost plans, buildability and any 154 
specialist procurement. 155 
 156 
These agreements provide a range of standard provisions and enable parties to set out the 157 
preconstruction services and methods of payment.  158 
 159 
In New Zealand, an operations manager for a nationwide construction company estimates that 160 
25-30 percent of their turnover in the Otago region is through two-stage ECI (personal 161 
communication, September 5, 2016). In the second-stage construction contract, where the 162 
contractor may be responsible for either design and build or construction only, the manager 163 
estimates that construction only is more common. This contrasts with Francis and Kiroff (2015) 164 
who researched perceptions of ECI in New Zealand and asserted that design and build is the 165 
most common form of ECI in New Zealand commercial construction.  166 
 167 
1.3 Research strategy and what this adds to the body of knowledge 168 
Procurement systems that enable ECI are evaluated in terms of how well they support OSM. A 169 
conceptual process model for two-stage ECI is developed. Key variables are identified from 170 
literature, three ethnographic case studies in Dunedin, Otago New Zealand between 2006 and 171 
2017, and document analysis. The projects have construction costs ranging from approximately 172 
$10-20 million NZD. Two involved complex alterations and extensions with high levels of 173 
building services. The third is an accommodation building comprising prefabricated timber 174 
structure. The lead author worked as the head contractor’s quantity surveyor in two projects 175 
between 2006 -2009.  The range of pre-construction services is identified through open coding 176 
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from ECI related literature. Legal doctrine is used to distinguish between obligations for design 177 
buildability versus design compliance with codes and standards. Each variable is considered in 178 
terms of optimal process based on theory and clarity of risk allocation. The conceptual model 179 
was presented at a conference and two further pre-construction services were added following 180 
feedback. Features of the model are aligned with overcoming the barriers to OSM adoption.  181 
 182 
2. Procurement needs for OSM 183 
It is generally agreed that there is no one perfect procurement strategy, rather, a strategy should 184 
be based on sensible policy (Murdoch and Hughes, 2008) and aligned with the client’s 185 
requirements and the nature of their project (Kirkham, 2007). Decision-making criteria include:  186 
 Involvement of the client with the construction process  187 
 Separation of design from management  188 
 Reserving the client’s right to alter the specification  189 
 Clarity of client’s contractual remedies  190 
 Complexity of the project  191 
 Speed from inception to completion  192 
 Certainty of price 193 
 194 
A range of procurement pathways exists for any construction project. Given the lack of clear 195 
definitions, McDermott and Rowlinson (1999) describe the debate around whether the term 196 
‘system’ or ‘model’ is appropriate to describe the options.  Nevertheless, the following 197 
procurement ‘models’ are generally recognised; design and build (DB), traditional (general 198 
contracting), design and build, construction management (CM), and management contracting 199 
(MC). In DB, the contractor has single-point responsibility for both design and construction; in 200 
traditional contracting, the client employs a design team to produce the design which when 201 
complete is tendered to builders; in management contracting the head contractor subcontracts 202 
all trade packages allowing them to be involved during the design stage more like a consultant; 203 
in construction management, the client employs all the trade contractors directly and a 204 
consultant to manage them.  205 
 206 
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For clients and consultants to make informed design decisions on projects involving OSM, 207 
Elnaas, Ashton and Gidado (2009) recommend procurement practices should facilitate the 208 
sharing of cost and buildability knowledge among manufacturers, constructors and designers. 209 
Single-stage procurement fails to resolve the buildability constraints of OSM because the 210 
contractor does not see the design until it is already fully developed. Kirkham (2007) 211 
demonstrates clearly how the potential for added value diminishes and the cost of change 212 
increases as the design is developed. 213 
 214 
The most prominent barrier to the uptake of OSM was the reluctance to adopt unfamiliar 215 
processes. Jergeas and Put (2001) found the risk aversion by owners and lack of knowledge of 216 
latest construction methods to be a key barrier to innovation. A key advantage of traditional 217 
lump sum contracts is that the procedures are well understood and the standard forms of 218 
construction contract provide familiarity and reliability through being well tried in case law 219 
(Ashworth, 2012; Kirkham, 2007). Traditional lump sum contracts remain the dominant contract 220 
form, accounting for about 75 percent of construction projects by number in the UK, with design 221 
and build the second most used at around 17.5 percent (RICS, 2010).  222 
 223 
Therefore, the optimal procurement strategy to enhance OSM should enable contractor 224 
involvement in the design, effectively allocate the risks of design and buildability, enable 225 
competitive lump sum pricing, and be developed in the form of a standard model than can 226 
become familiar and tested over time. Procurement models that provide ECI include; design and 227 
build, MC, CM, partnering and alliance contracts, and general contracting with two-stage 228 
tenders.  229 
 230 
3. Procurement systems suitable for OSM 231 
Design and build procurement would be suitable for projects with OSM where the design is 232 
straightforward and changes during construction are unlikely. Under CM and MC the consultant 233 
or head contractor can provide input to the design around planning and buildability, while the 234 
client retains ownership of the design. The project can be fast-tracked by overlapping design 235 
and construction and OSM elements can be ordered in time to avoid delay. If pricing is equal, 236 
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the reduced risk exposure of MC is advantageous over CM for lay clients. Under CM, the client 237 
employs the specialist contractors directly with a consultant to manage them and so adopts 238 
more risk than the single-point accountability of a head contractor. 239 
 240 
Consultant construction managers do incur implied legal obligations, including; warning the 241 
client of poor performance by others in the project team (Chesham Properties v Bucknall Austin, 242 
1996), coordinating trade works (Donohoe and Brooks, 2007); planning, monitoring and 243 
controlling activities and resources (Griffith and Watson, 2004); and warning the client of 244 
contractual risk (Monastiriotis & Bodnar, 2013; Plymouth & South West Co-Op Soc. Ltd v 245 
Architecture, Structure & Management Ltd, 2006). However, their duty is limited to taking 246 
reasonable skill and care, whereas a head contractor’s liability is absolute or a fitness for 247 
purpose obligation. For example, contractors are responsible for any building defects and may 248 
be liable for liquidated or general damages. In contrast, if a project is delivered late under CM, 249 
the client must rely on the consultant having sufficiently accurate records to pinpoint the 250 
damages on individual trade contractors, or the client must prove that the breach is a 251 
consequence of the consultant’s negligence (Monastiriotis and Bodnar, 2013). Moreover, 252 
Laryea (2010) found that contractors’ buildability and pricing advice may be more accurate than 253 
that of consultants’, on the basis that contractors perform the works and are contractually 254 
accountable for the accuracy of their estimates. This could be beneficial when comparing costs 255 
between OSM and traditional assemblies. A two-stage procurement process may be used to 256 
select a contractor for design and build, construction only or management only.  257 
 258 
4. Findings: Key variables of pre-construction stage 259 
From the case studies, key variables in first stage of the two-stage process include:  260 
i. The scope of services to be provided by the contractor, such as; planning and 261 
sequencing the works, designing elements, providing buildability advice, risk 262 
management, value management, and procuring subcontractors;  263 
ii. How or whether the contractor is reimbursed for their early input, such as; no payment, 264 
lump sum component of preliminaries, and cost reimbursement;  265 
10 
 
iii. Under what grounds the project may be terminated without proceeding to construction 266 
phase, such as; if over budget, external intervener groups;  267 
iv. What happens if the project does not proceed to the construction phase, such as; the 268 
contractor does not charge for their early involvement, the contractor does not charge 269 
but is paid if the project does not proceed to construction, or the contractor does charge 270 
but offers a discount if the project does proceed to construction;  271 
v. Whether the contractor is to perform any direct works (such as the head contractor 272 
performing concrete and carpentry works) and if so, how this is priced, such as; 273 
competitive lump sum or whether any fixed rates are to be provided against provisional 274 
quantities to be re-measured against the detailed design later;  275 
vi. The clear allocation of design and buildability obligations;  276 
vii. Who owns any intellectual property;  277 
viii. Key milestones for providing information;  278 
ix. Contractual provisions that encourage a collaborative culture, such as requiring parties 279 
to act in “good faith”, or “mutual trust and co-operation”. 280 
 281 
The above model was presented at the Modular Construction and Pre-fabrication conference in 282 
Auckland, New Zealand December 2017. The following pre-construction services were 283 
suggested during the feedback session: 284 
 Liaising with local authorities to obtain compliance for pre-fabricated components.  285 
 Coordinating documentation for building information modelling (BIM).  286 
 287 
The following sections expand on some of the variables and consider alternative options in 288 
terms of theory and risk allocation.  289 
 290 
4.2 Pricing and timing 291 
Head contractors were found to generally tender first-stage prices based on the following: 292 
I. A lump sum price for the preliminaries works for the whole project where construction 293 
work is staged;  294 
11 
 
II. A lump sum price for the construction of any first stage for which design is already 295 
developed (for example where the project is released in stages);  296 
III. Percentages to be applied for onsite and offsite overheads and profit to be applied to 297 
variations and subcontractors to be procured;  298 
IV. Fixed rates for provisional quantities of any direct construction works (for example 299 
carpentry and concrete) based on conceptual design;  300 
V. Non-price attributes such as a base construction program, methodology, and history of 301 
similar past projects; 302 
 303 
Lump sum contracts provide price surety before work commences. Risks are transferred to the 304 
contractor with narrow grounds under which the contractor can claim additional costs or time. In 305 
a cost reimbursement contract, the contractor is paid based on agreed rates and percentages 306 
applied to materials and subcontractors. However, this may incentivize the contractor to 307 
overspend (Turner, 2004). A target value or guaranteed maximum price may be used with gain-308 
share / pain-share provisions to align goals. However, auditing is required to ensure claims are 309 
accurate.  310 
 311 
One argument for partnering with open-book pricing is that the lack of defined scope at the time 312 
of early involvement prohibits competitive pricing (Rahman and Alhassan, 2012, p218). 313 
However, lump sum pricing can be determined for preliminaries works so long as sufficient 314 
concept design exists to establish such requirements such as management, supervision, 315 
insurances, and temporary works. Head contractors can declare margins for profit 316 
and overheads to apply to subcontractors and variations, plus a lump sum construction price for 317 
any first-stage work already designed or fixed rates for carpentry and concrete works against a 318 
provisional schedule of quantities. The quantities can then be re-measured once the design is 319 
developed to produce a bill of quantities applying the rates of the original tender (see Pheng, 320 
Gao and Lin, 2015) and arrive at a lump sum construction price. Because the quantities are only 321 
provisional and will be re-measured, they could be measured by a consultant quantity surveyor 322 
or the contractor. The client or consultant will need to check the accuracy of the contractor’s 323 
final quantities.  324 
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 325 
Timing of contractor involvement is crucial to enabling competitive and accurate pricing. Some 326 
argue that to maximise value, contractors should be involved from “day one” of the design 327 
process (Jergeas and Put, 2001, p283). Others contend that a concept design is needed first 328 
because if the client has very specific ideas about the finished product, the contractor may have 329 
nothing to add, or may waste time developing proposals for a client who does not know what 330 
they want (Francis and Kiroff, 2015). If the contractor is appointed too early they might lack 331 
motivation to appoint their best staff and there can be a loss of design creativity if the team does 332 
not work well together and the designer steps back as the contractor pursues buildability and 333 
cost saving efficiencies (Whitehead, 2009). In addition it is arguable that generally designers 334 
prefer to work solely with their client to develop concept design (Francis and Kiroff, 2015). On 335 
the whole it is contended that the optimum time for contractor engagement is once sufficient 336 
conceptual design exists to enable competitive lump sum pricing for preliminaries and fixed 337 
rates against provisional quantities for direct works. Delaying beyond this will reduce the 338 
contractor’s potential to evaluate design options.  339 
 340 
4.3 Payment 341 
One drawback of two-stage ECI is the client pays for the contractor earlier than they would 342 
under single-stage tenders and may pay for the contractor’s cost of pricing construction. 343 
However, when contractors tender in the open market, they incur the cost of tendering with a 344 
higher risk of not winning. Pricing the first-stage of ECI incurs fewer resources than preparing a 345 
full tender, and then if successful, the contractor works toward a well-planned project that they 346 
can be reasonably sure of proceeding. Therefore, why should the client pay for the contractor to 347 
price construction work under ECI? Figure 1 demonstrates the two-stage conceptual process 348 
model based on no payment for the pre-construction stage unless the project does not proceed 349 
to construction.   350 
 351 
Insert Figure 1 here. 352 
 353 
Figure 1: Two-stage ECI process model with no payment option for pre-construction stage 354 
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 355 
Laryea and Watermeyer (2016) provide case studies of two construction projects for Wits 356 
University in South Africa procured through two-stage ECI in which the contractor received “no 357 
remuneration for the involvement in design development” as, “they value the benefits of 358 
developing early cost models and production plans.” In one of the case studies, the lead author 359 
worked as a contractor’s quantity surveyor on a $9 million health project in 2006-2008 procured 360 
through two-stage ECI where the contractor did not charge for their early-involvement. The head 361 
contractor appointed in another of the case studies - a student accommodation project - is 362 
charging for their early involvement, but with a discount if the project proceeds to construction. 363 
Three options exist for first-stage pricing;  364 
 365 
a) The contractor does not charge for their involvement; or  366 
b) The contractor does not charge, but is reimbursed if the client does not progress the 367 
project to construction phase;  368 
c) The contractor charges, but offers a discount if the project proceeds to construction 369 
phase.  370 
Any first-stage price may be cost reimbursement or fixed price component of the lump sum 371 
preliminaries price.   372 
 373 
4.4 Pre-construction services  374 
Pre-construction services include the planning, design, and procurement activities that lead up 375 
to the physical construction work. These may include; planning and sequencing construction 376 
activities, design review and specialist design contributions, risk and value management, and 377 
subcontractor procurement. According to Mosey (2011) early stage contracts can support the 378 
project by setting out the head contractor and subcontractors’ contributions to buildability, 379 
affordability and design appropriateness, testing the scope for savings, and evaluating the 380 
viability of new ideas across the project’s whole life cycle. Mosey recommends that a 381 
communication plan be included and a program that includes deadlines for team members to 382 
provide information. This is echoed by The Centre of Construction Law and Dispute Resolution 383 
Kings College (2016) who recommend that any procurement processes to support BIM should; 384 
14 
 
set out key milestones for providing information, address who owns intellectual property; and 385 
provide contractual provisions that encourage collaboration. Pre-construction services have 386 
been open-coded from literature and are presented as follows: 387 
 388 
Table 1: Pre-construction services open-coded from literature  389 
Pre-construction services  Sources  
Design management Tzortzopoulos and Cooper (2007); Sidwell (1983) 
Plan and co-ordinate design Tzortzopoulos and Cooper (2007) 
Stakeholder management and communications 
strategy 
Tzortzopoulos and Cooper (2007); Mosey (2009); Education 
(2016); Berends (2006) 
Develop design brief Tzortzopoulos and Cooper (2007); Education.govt.nz (2017) 
Construction planning  
Planning and sequencing construction activities El-sayegh (2009); Mosey (2009); Kashiwagi, Kashiwagi and 
Savicky (2009); Sidwell (1983) 
Buildability evaluation Laryea and Watermeyer, (2016); Pheng, Gao and Lin (2015); 
Rahman and Alhassan (2012); Mosey, (2011); Rahmani, 
Khalfan and Maqsood (2014); Whitehead (2009); Song, et al. 
(2006); Jergeas and Put (2001); Sidwell (1983) 
Financial  
Budget advice Kirkham (2007); Laryea (2010); Sidwell (1983) 
Value management Mosey (2011); Kirkham (2007); Whitehead (2009); Jergeas 
and Put (2001); Kashiwagi, Kashiwagi and Savicky (2009) 
Risk management Rahman and Alhassan (2012); Mosey (2009); 
Education.govt.nz (2017); Jergeas and Put (2001); Kashiwagi, 
Kashiwagi and Savicky (2009) 
Supply chain  
Subcontractor and supplier procurement El-sayegh (2009); Whitehead (2009); Mosey (2009) ; Sidwell 
(1983) 
 390 
If the head contractor becomes involved once concept design is developed, stakeholder 391 
management and developing the design brief must be done by the client’s project manager or 392 
architect. The remainder could be specified for the contractor.  393 
 394 
4.5 Obligations for design and buildability  395 
A risk of adopting OSM technology involves unknown buildability issues rendering the design 396 
more expensive to construct than comparable traditional assemblies, or worse, tendering a fully 397 
developed design only to find that the design is not buildable.  398 
 399 
The implied legal duty imposed on a designer or project manager is that of reasonable skill and 400 
care. The test is measured against what any other ordinarily skilled person in the same 401 
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discipline would have done given similar circumstances (Powell, 2009; Read, 2004; Bolam, 402 
1957).  403 
 404 
The implied legal duty imposed for construction work is fitness for purpose. Fitness for purpose 405 
imposes a higher standard than that of reasonable skill and care. The standard is absolute 406 
guarantee of product performance imposed on manufacturers, which also falls onto contractors 407 
in the construction sector (Burrows, Finn and Todd, 2012). Where a contractor is also 408 
responsible for design, their implied legal duty defaults to fitness for purpose (Brown, 2011; 409 
Steensma, 2010). Therefore, where a manufacturer designs and supplies pre-fabricated 410 
modular or prefabricated elements, they are responsible for those elements being fit for their 411 
intended purpose and defect free, regardless of what any other designer would have done, 412 
unless the contract provides otherwise. Like most published standard forms of construction 413 
contracts around in the UK and many other Commonwealth jurisdictions, published construction 414 
contracts in New Zealand such as the NZS3910:2013 (clause 5.1.4), NZIA SCC 2014 (clause 415 
8.6.5), and RMBF SA 2009 (clause 6.1.1) all reduce the liability for any contractor’s design work 416 
to that of reasonable skill, care and diligence.  417 
 418 
Designers are responsible for ensuring that their design will perform according to relevant codes 419 
when constructed using reasonable standards or workmanship (George Fischer Holding Ltd v 420 
Multi Design Consultants Ltd (1998) and levels of supervision (Equitable Debenture Assets 421 
Corporation Ltd v William Moss Group Ltd, 1984). This is reflected in the New Zealand Building 422 
Act (2004) which requires designers to produce designs in compliance with the New Zealand 423 
Building Code (NZBC) when built using reasonable standards of workmanship.  424 
 425 
By offering a lump sum price, a contractor warrants that (i) they can build what has been 426 
designed, and (ii) they can build it for the price offered. Anything that makes the work more 427 
difficult is the contractor’s risk including design defects from a buildability perspective 428 
(Rosenberg, 2012). Once appointed, contractors are legally required to notify the designer of 429 
certain design defects (Glover, 2006). 430 
 431 
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Standard forms of construction contracts commonly relieve the contractor for reasonably 432 
unforeseeable physical conditions that substantially affect the cost of the work. This would cover 433 
instances where the contractor uncovers unexpected rock during excavation work, or 434 
unexpected steel structure or asbestos when wall linings are removed. However, such 435 
provisions would unlikely cover re-designs required in the event of site restrictions making 436 
delivery of precast panels un-deliverable, or where pre-fabricated components are designed too 437 
large for manufacturing facilities, or where designed windows do not fit prepared openings due 438 
to connectivity issues with the design. The first-stage pre-construction contract provides an 439 
opportunity to address these risks. 440 
 441 
5. Conclusions  442 
Early contractor involvement (ECI) offers significant advantages for projects that use OSM 443 
technologies. Designers and contractors can work collaboratively in developing the design, 444 
managing risks, undertaking value management exercises, and procuring specialist 445 
subcontractors. The contractor can evaluate costs and buildability of design options, for 446 
example comparing OSM technology with more traditional assemblies, and adopt clearer 447 
contractual responsibility for design buildability than is afforded under many standard forms of 448 
construction contracts. The more integrated approach overcomes current segmentation and 449 
enables client and designers to make more informed decisions about adopting OSM and can 450 
reduce the potential for potential future buildability problems and related variations and disputes 451 
during construction. Depending on whether or how the contractor is paid for their early 452 
involvement there may be little or no additional cost to the client - recognizing the benefit to the 453 
contractor of a better planned and more buildable project.  454 
 455 
Contract documentation for the first-stage of two-stage ECI should clearly set out among other 456 
things; (i) the scope of services to be provided by the contractor such as planning, budgeting, 457 
buildability evaluation, risk management, value management, and subcontractor procurement, 458 
(ii) key milestones for communication exchange and supply of elements, (iii) who owns 459 
intellectual property, (iv) whether or how the contractor is paid for their early-involvement, (v) 460 
under what grounds the client can terminate the project, (vi) what happens if the project does 461 
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not proceed to the construction phase, and (vii) parties’ obligations around design and 462 
construction, whether for individual elements or for the overall design, and the contractor’s early 463 
notification of design issues.  464 
 465 
Opportunity exists in New Zealand to develop a standard form of first-stage pre-construction 466 
contract for two-stage ECI procurement for use with a standard form of construction contract for 467 
the second stage (such as NZS3910:2013 or NZIA SCC 2014). This could help overcome the 468 
barrier to OSM relating to conservative market culture by becoming familiar and tested over 469 
time. Provision for competitive lump sum pricing across all tiers of the supply chain may also 470 
suit risk adverse clients. To the extend a standard model for two-stage ECI becomes recognised 471 
for reducing design buildability risk, it is conceivable that in extreme cases consultants could 472 
potentially be held negligent for not recommending ECI processes for complex projects for 473 
exposing their client to unjustifiable design buildability risks.  474 
 475 
 476 
 477 
 478 
 479 
 480 
 481 
 482 
 483 
 484 
 485 
 486 
 487 
 488 
 489 
 490 
 491 
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